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132.
MIXED CONCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE
R awls calls a conception of justice a mixed conception when it combineshis first principle, the principle of equal liberties, with a principle of dis-tributive justice other than his second principle, such as average utility
(TJ 107 and §49).
Mixed conceptions help clarify the justification of principles from the orig-
inal position. In the 1999 revised edition of TJ, Rawls expresses regrets not to
have presented the argument from the original position for the two principles of
justice by way of a comparison with a mixed conception:
It would have been better to present [the argument] in terms of two com-
parisons. In the first parties would decide between the two principles of
justice, taken as a unit, and the principle of (average) utility as the sole
principle of justice. In the second comparison, the parties would decide
between the two principles of justice and those same principles but for one
important change: the principle of (average) utility is substituted for the
difference principle. (The two principles after this substitution I called a
mixed conception, and here it is understood that the principle of utility is
to be applied subject to the constraints of the prior principles: the princi-
ple of the equal liberties and the principle of fair equality of opportunity.)
(TJ xiv, emphasis added)
In contrasting this mixed conception with justice as fairness, Rawls is able
to separate out arguments for the equal basic liberties and their priority, and
for fair equality of opportunity, from the argument for the difference principle.
Rawls considers that the arguments for the equal basic liberties and their priority
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are very strong, and would be established by a first comparison between his two
principles and an unconstrained principle of average utility as the sole principle
of justice. (The principle of average utility says that the institutions of the basic
structure are to be arranged so as to maximize the average welfare of the mem-
bers of society.) The parties assume that they have an interest in the fulfillment
of their moral and religious conceptions. The two principles protect the basic
rights and liberties and provide an adequate complement of the primary goods
to exercise and enjoy those freedoms. To agree to the principle of average utility
might jeopardize those rights and liberties, in particular for minorities. There-
fore the parties would not take this kind of risk. Furthermore, the basic liberties
protect fundamental interests that have a special significance: thus the priority of
the first principle over the second.
By contrast, Rawls considers that a second comparison, focused on advan-
tages of the difference principle, involves more delicate considerations. In this
second comparison Rawls’s two principles of justice are contrasted with the same
principles with one change: the principle of average utility combined with a social
minimum is substituted for the difference principle. This mixed conception is the
principle of restricted utility. The basic structure maximizes average utility, but
under two constraints: first equal basic liberties and fair equality of opportunities
are guaranteed, and second a suitable social minimum is also introduced. The
social minimum is intended to meet essential human needs; its incorporation in
themixed conceptionmakes the principle of restricted utility a particularly robust
alternative to the two principles of justice. Rawls concedes that his two principles
and a principle of restricted utility might not be very far apart if we restrict our-
selves to the social policies which would result from the principles. In particular,
the least well off are assured not only against denial of liberties or opportunities,
but also against serious losses of well-being. Still, this might not be sufficient
for the worst off to feel “that they are a part of political society” ( JF 127). There-
fore, the crucial consideration which weighs in favour of the difference principle
over the principle of restricted utility is the Ralwsian idea of society as a fair sys-
tem of cooperation. In a society arranged as a fair system of cooperation between
citizens, a principle of reciprocity whereby those who are better off are not better
off to the detriment of those who are worse off is superior to amaximizing principle
such as average utility however constrained. This suggests that behind the veil of
ignorance the parties would endorse the difference principle. That is: they would
choose a principle whereby those who gain more do so on terms acceptable to
those who gain the least.
Why is it so important for Rawls to make the comparison between his prin-
ciples and the mixed conception of restricted utility? First, because it allows us
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to understand more deeply the contrast between the utilitarian’s conception of
society as a system arranged to produce most good over all of its members and
the Rawlsian idea of society as a fair system of cooperation. Second, because this
comparison between a mixed conception and Rawls’s two principles highlights
that the argument for the difference principle does not rest, pace what Arrow,
Harsanyi, and many others had thought, on aversion to risk, but rather on reci-
procity between citizens regarded as free and equal.
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